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THE FUTURE OF MASS TORTS 
The evolving case law on aggregate litigation, based largely on no-
tions of notice and due process (embodied in “day in court” prin-
ciples), has been met with significant criticism on both sides by refor-
mers who claim that the system is inherently unfair or wasteful. 
Professor Sergio Campos argues for a change in course from the 
current treatment of mass torts.  The current model of providing each 
individual plaintiff a “day in court,” he suggests, ultimately under-
mines plaintiffs’ interests by dividing the potential recovery—and thus 
the litigation incentives—among the plaintiffs while leaving the de-
fendant with the full incentive to avoid litigation.  Although the Su-
preme Court has recently upheld plaintiffs’ right to individual litiga-
tion, due process need not be inherently inflexible.  By looking to 
older precedent, such as Mullane, Campos supports a “compelled, col-
lective ownership” of claims by procedures such as multi-district litiga-
tion or the mandatory class action.  Although this model may infringe 
on “litigant autonomy,” Campos argues that this is ultimately neces-
sary to best protect the interests of mass tort plaintiffs. 
In response, Professor Erichson argues that one need not resort to 
mandatory class actions or similar procedural tools in order to even 
the playing field between mass tort plaintiffs and defendants. Often, 
even non-class mass tort litigation is resolved by mass settlement and 
involves consolidated pretrial work. Because most mass tort lawsuits 
involve highly incentivized lawyers who do common benefit work, the 
marginal gain from a mandatory class action does not outweigh the 
losses associated with fully separating control over settlement from 
ownership of the claim.  Indeed, the current state of mass tort litiga-
tion may well provide greater leverage for mass tort plaintiffs than 
those with completely independent claims.  Thus, Professor Erichson 
concludes, it is not at all clear that the future of mass torts is “bleak.” 
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OPENING STATEMENT 
The Future of Mass Torts . . . and How to Stop It 
Sergio J. Campos†
Though the future of mass torts is uncertain, if the present is any 
indication, it is bleak.  Mass torts have perplexed courts for decades, 
but only because courts insist on protecting an empty conception of a 
“day in court.”  Consequently, courts have rejected the use of a num-
ber of procedures, most notably the class action, to resolve mass tort 
claims.  But the obsession with protecting this conception of a “day in 
court,” sometimes expressed as a need to protect “litigant autonomy,” 
or to protect a plaintiff’s “property” in her claim, or to ensure valid 
“consent” to the resolution of claims, is self-defeating.  It leads to 
more mass torts.  To break this vicious circle, courts need to reject the 
day in court as a procedural ideal. 
 
Mass torts are a consequence of mass production activity in a 
number of industries, and include torts caused by asbestos and other 
toxic chemicals, pharmaceuticals, product defects, and oil spills, 
among many other causes.  Mass torts produce a large number of 
plaintiffs, each with varying circumstances.  Many of these plaintiffs, 
such as those who suffer significant injury or death, have high-value 
claims.  Thus, unlike plaintiffs with small-value claims, most mass tort 
plaintiffs have sufficient incentive to bring suit separately, and may 
even value their “autonomy” over their claims.  Moreover, resolving 
mass tort claims en masse may result in inadequate representation, 
because a subclass of plaintiffs may bias a judgment in its favor, or a 
class attorney may sell out the plaintiffs for a cheap settlement.  In-
deed, in two prior cases, Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 
(1997) and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999), the Supreme 
Court rejected global settlement class actions in asbestos litigation 
precisely because of these concerns. 
Although these concerns are valid, courts ignore the deterrence 
produced by mass tort litigation.  Many of the industries subject to po-
tential mass tort liability are lightly regulated or, as evidenced by the 
Minerals Management Service’s performance prior to the BP oil spill, 
 
† Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.  These views are 
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inadequately so.  See Ian Urbina, U.S. Said to Allow Drilling Without 
Needed Permits, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2010, at A1.  Consequently, tort lia-
bility remains one of the primary methods of regulating these indus-
tries, because it deters unlawful behavior. 
The deterrent effect of mass tort litigation is far from ideal, how-
ever, because the defendant has an inherent advantage over the plain-
tiffs.  Despite the plaintiffs’ varying circumstances, the defendant’s 
liability will depend on a number of issues that are common to the 
plaintiffs, such as whether the defendant had prior knowledge of the 
risks of asbestos exposure.  See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 
471-72 (5th Cir. 1986).  A defendant will invest more on common is-
sues relative to any individual plaintiff because the defendant has 
more at stake.  A plaintiff seeking $500,000 in damages would balk at 
spending $500,000 on an epidemiological study to prove causation, 
and may try to conduct one on the cheap, as the plaintiffs’ attorneys 
did in the Agent Orange litigation.  See PETER H. SHUCK, AGENT 
ORANGE ON TRIAL 53 (1987).  But a defendant facing hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in liability will not scrimp on such a study.  Thus, a de-
fendant can exploit “naturally occurring economies of scale” to invest 
in common issues that a plaintiff acting alone cannot.  ALI, PRIN-
CIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 cmt. b(3) (2010). 
It is true that the plaintiffs voluntarily aggregate their claims to 
reach similar economies of scale as the defendant, and such informal 
aggregation is common in mass tort litigation.  But strategic behavior 
prevents the plaintiffs from completely matching the defendant’s scale 
advantages.  A plaintiff may not want to mix her surefire claim with 
dubious ones in a class action, or she may simply free-ride off of the 
work of others.  A plaintiff who sues separately, however, shoots her-
self in the foot.  By failing to match the firepower of the defendant, 
the litigation is not only biased in favor of the defendant, but it wea-
kens the deterrent effect of mass tort liability.  A defendant, knowing 
it can divide and conquer the plaintiffs in any subsequent litigation, 
will have less incentive to take precautions to avoid mass torts in the 
first place.  Thus, going alone ultimately leads to more mass torts.  
Few, if anyone, would choose to protect a day in court when the price 
is cancer or death. 
The problem of asymmetric stakes in mass tort litigation is, at bot-
tom, a property problem.  The defendant owns all of the liability asso-
ciated with a common issue, while the recovery (the flip side of liabili-
ty) is divided among the plaintiffs.  Plaintiffs, moreover, cannot 
aggregate to match the scale of ownership of the defendant primarily 
because their preferences change after the tort occurs.  Before the 
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tort occurs, the plaintiffs would insist on aggregating to deter the de-
fendant and thus prevent the mass tort from happening in the first 
place.  But after the tort occurs, the tort cannot be undone and the 
plaintiffs only care about recovering as much as possible.  This leads 
to a vicious circle of more mass torts because plaintiffs assert their “li-
tigant autonomy,” which leads to more mass torts, which leads to more 
“litigant autonomy,” and so on. 
Such a precommitment problem is not unique to mass torts, as 
any smoker or dieter will tell you.  Nor is the problem new to the law, 
as it is analogous to “tragedy of the commons” situations that arise 
from insufficiently scaled ownership interests.  Just as individual graz-
ing rights may cause the overgrazing of commonly owned land, indi-
vidually owned claims lead to more mass torts—the very thing the 
claims sought to deter. 
To prevent this problem, some form of compelled, collective 
ownership of the claims is necessary.  This can be accomplished 
through a mandatory class action, which effectively assigns collective 
ownership of the claims to class counsel.  It can also be accomplished 
through procedures like multidistrict litigation, where a court assigns 
collective ownership of the claims to lead counsel for common benefit 
work, at least for pretrial purposes.  See Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. 
Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litiga-
tions:  Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107 (2010). 
It is true that assigning collective ownership of the claims to a 
third party may result in the inadequate representation that con-
cerned the Court in Amchem and Ortiz.  Inadequate representation, 
however, is best avoided through other aspects of procedural design 
that have nothing to do with protecting a day in court.  For example, 
adjustments to the fees paid to class attorneys can ensure that their in-
terests are aligned with those of the class.  In fact, a mandatory class 
action provides much-needed leverage for the plaintiffs in settlement 
negotiations.  Moreover, antisuit injunctions to 
stop competing class actions can prevent “reverse auctions” in which 
the defendant awards a class action settlement to the lowest bidder.  
Finally, increased use of damage scheduling, or compensation based 
upon a grid of average awards for certain categories of injuries, can 
avoid any bias in distributing the recovery.  Damage scheduling is 
perhaps the most controversial of these measures since it may redi-
stribute some of the recovery from high-value to low-value claims.  
However, averaging already happens when attorneys rely upon prior 
awards to determine the settlement value of existing cases.  See Alex-
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andra D. Lahav, Rough Justice 11-12 (Aug. 9, 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1562677.  It is unclear whether the status quo 
causes more or less redistribution than damage scheduling. 
The resistance to damage scheduling shows just how strangely 
courts have conceived a day in court.  A class action allows for plain-
tiffs’ ample participation, particularly during the distribution of any 
recovery, which preserves a meaningful day in court.  But the Su-
preme Court has equated a day in court with an inviolable right to a 
claim for damages that cannot be taken away without one’s consent.  
In Ortiz, for example, the Court invoked the “deep-rooted historic tra-
dition that everyone should have his own day in court” to support its 
rejection of a mandatory settlement class action in asbestos litigation, 
because the “legal rights of absent class members . . . are resolved re-
gardless of . . . their consent.”  Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 
846-47 (1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Re-
cently the Court invoked this same “historic tradition” of a “day in 
court” to reject the preclusion doctrine of “virtual representation,” 
noting as an aside that notice is generally required in “class actions 
seeking monetary relief.”  Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892-93, 900-
01 n.11 (2008).  Finally, in Shady Grove Othopedic Associates, P.A. v. 
Allstate Insurance Co., Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality, concluded 
that a class action for statutory damages certified under Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure Rule 23 does not “abridge, enlarge, or modify a 
substantive right,” as required under the Rules Enabling Act, “insofar 
as it allows willing plaintiffs to join their separate claims against the 
same defendants in a class action.”  130 S. Ct. 1431, 1443 (2010) (em-
phasis added).  Presumably, in the plurality’s view, a class action that 
included unwilling plaintiffs would not only “abridge” one’s day in 
court, but may invalidate Rule 23 in the process. 
It does not have to be this way.  In its recent decisions, the Court 
has quoted Hansberry v. Lee for the “principle of general application” 
that “one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in 
which he is not designated as a party.”  311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940).  But 
the Hansberry Court stressed that due process is flexible, and requires 
only that the procedure, whatever it may be, “fairly insures the protec-
tion of the interests of absent parties who are to be bound by it.”  Id. at 
42.  The Court took such a flexible, context-specific approach in Mul-
lane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., where it examined a New 
York statute that permitted the aggregation of small trusts for com-
mon administration, but allowed for periodic judicial “accountings” 
which settled, and would preclude, all claims against the common 
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trust fund administrator.  339 U.S. 306, 308-09 (1950).  Mullane is 
generally cited for the proposition that a “fundamental requirement 
of due process . . . is notice reasonably calculated . . . to apprise inter-
ested parties,” and indeed the Court criticized the paltry newspaper 
notice for the settlement proceedings provided by the statute in this 
case.  Id. at 314-15.  But the Court permitted such newspaper notice 
for beneficiaries with unknown “whereabouts,” and noted with respect 
to unidentifiable, contingent beneficiaries that to require more 
“would impose a severe burden on the plan, and would likely dissipate 
its advantages.”  Id. at 317-18.  Although newspaper notice increased 
the risk that a beneficiary would lose a day in court, the Court recog-
nized that to protect such a right absolutely may destroy common 
fund trusts altogether. 
Mullane suggests an alternative path from our current trajectory.  
Instead of fixating on a day in court, courts could follow Mullane by 
being sensitive to the various interests bound up in the claim, particu-
larly the deterrence it provides.  By taking such a context-sensitive ap-
proach, courts can recognize that, in the mass tort context, protecting 
a day in court above all else would “dissipate its advantages.”  Thus, to 
stop the future of mass torts, we may need to look to the past. 
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REBUTTAL 
Aggregation and Settlement of Mass Torts in the Real World:   
A Rebuttal to the Mandatory Class Actions Idea 
Howard M. Erichson†
Professor Campos offers a provocative argument in favor of man-
datory class actions for mass tort litigation.  I will attempt to show why, 
despite his argument’s elegance, its conclusion is flawed.  Along the 
way, I hope to show that neither the present nor the future of mass 
tort resolution is as bleak as Professor Campos thinks it is.  The messy 
reality of aggregate processing, scattered trials, and mass nonclass set-
tlements lacks the neat symmetry of class litigation, but it strikes a bet-
ter balance between the need for a level field and the recognition that 
tort claims belong to tort claimants. 
 
Professor Campos’s argument runs as follows:  In multiplaintiff, 
single-defendant mass litigation, the parties face asymmetric stakes.  
Therefore defendants rationally spend more resources on the litiga-
tion than any plaintiff.  This gives defendants an inherent advantage, 
which in turn reduces overall liability below the ideal level.  Inade-
quate liability means underdeterrence.  Without adequate deterrence, 
potential mass tortfeasors commit more mass torts, causing more 
harm.  The solution, according to Professor Campos, is “compelled, 
collective ownership of the claims.” 
Aggregation is essential for leveling the field in light of the asym-
metric stakes that characterize mass tort litigation.  To this extent, 
Professor Campos and I have no disagreement.  The question is not 
whether aggregation is needed, but what form it should take.  The 
form he suggests—mandatory class action—would deprive claimants 
of control over whether to release their claims in settlement.  In order 
to get the benefits of economies of scale and investment based on ag-
gregate stakes, do plaintiffs really need to relinquish settlement con-
trol to representatives and class counsel?  No—plaintiffs can obtain 
most of those benefits by aggregate processing in which steering 
committees and other leadership counsel perform common benefit 
work while each plaintiff retains the ultimate right to decide whether 
to release the claim. 
Mass tort litigation in the twenty-first century runs a fairly predict-
able pattern.  Think of major mass torts of the past decade, such as 
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Vioxx, Zyprexa, Baycol, World Trade Center, and the BP oil spill.  
Each litigation brings its own twists, but the general pattern is consis-
tent:  A triggering event occurs.  Many lawsuits are filed.  Certain 
plaintiffs’ lawyers emerge as dominant players with large numbers of 
clients.  Federal court cases are transferred for consolidated pretrial 
proceedings under the Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) statute (or, in 
the case of the World Trade Center litigation, a statutory forum con-
straint channels all of the cases to a single federal court, see Air 
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 408(b)(3)), while 
some of the state cases are centralized on a statewide basis.  Lawyers 
are appointed to steering committees and other leadership roles.  
Class certification is denied, at least for the personal injury and wrong-
ful death cases.  The cases, therefore, proceed nominally as individual 
claims, but with lawyers selected to do common benefit work in the 
MDL performing the lion’s share of the legal work.  Court-imposed 
assessments on individual judgments and settlements compensate 
these lawyers.  A few individual cases may head to trial, often under 
the aegis of the MDL judge and often with the stated purpose of serv-
ing as bellwethers.  If the claims have sufficient traction, then at some 
point settlement negotiations ensue between the defendant and plain-
tiffs’ leadership counsel.  In negotiating a settlement, counsel use the 
information gleaned from any trials that have occurred, and from dis-
covery conducted in the MDL and any legal rulings by the MDL judge 
and other judges overseeing consolidated proceedings.  If the defen-
dant reaches agreement with the negotiating plaintiffs’ lawyers on the 
terms of a settlement, the proposed settlement is conveyed to the 
claimants.  Those claimants can decide whether to accept or reject the 
settlement, and overwhelmingly they accept a settlement their lawyers 
recommend. 
Obviously, this story oversimplifies the course of mass tort litiga-
tion and the variations in their lifecycles.  In the BP litigation, for ex-
ample, the defendant established a compensation fund to resolve 
claims beginning very early in the litigation, even before an MDL 
judge had been appointed.  See GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, 
http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com (last visited Mar. 4, 2011) .  In 
the Zyprexa litigation, there was a mass settlement before any individ-
ual trials occurred.  See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d 
256, 262-63 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).  Multiple defendants and insurers may 
complicate matters.  But for purposes of responding to Professor 
Campos’s argument, these variations pale in comparison to two criti-
cal points about modern mass tort litigation:  the endgame is often a 
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wholesale negotiated resolution of claims, and much of the legal work 
for plaintiffs is handled in aggregated proceedings and performed by 
lawyers who are well compensated for their common benefit work. 
The first point is that mass tort litigation often is resolved through 
mass settlements, even without class certification.  Professor Campos 
suggests that the obstacle to fully collective resolution of mass torts is 
an “obsession with protecting a ‘day in court.’”  But the “day in court” 
language misses the point.  In mass litigation, no one expects that 
more than a handful of individual claims will be tried and individually 
adjudicated.  In the Vioxx litigation, fewer than twenty individual 
claims were tried.  See Alexandra D. Lahav, Rediscovering the Social Value 
of Jurisdictional Redundancy, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2369, 2394 nn. 106-07 
(2008).  Merck, however, settled over 33,000 claims in a mass settle-
ment program.  See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 
559 (E.D. La. 2009).  Eli Lilly settled over 25,000 Zyprexa claims in 
two mass settlements, with zero individual trials.  See Alex Berenson, 
Lilly Settles with 18,000 over Zyprexa, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2007, at C1.  The 
BP oil spill litigation already has resulted in tens of thousands of set-
tlements through the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, with few if any trials 
on the horizon.  Mass tort claims are not resolved in court; they are 
resolved at the negotiating table by lawyers representing hundreds or 
thousands of claimants.  Better, therefore, to steer clear of the “day in 
court” language and instead to focus on the real issue:  When a de-
fendant offers a mass settlement, do claimants have the right to de-
cline the offer, or can they be compelled by their lawyer and the court 
to be bound by a particular negotiated resolution of their claims? 
The second point is that every mass tort litigation receives aggre-
gated pretrial handling through MDL or comparable forms of consol-
idation, and well-compensated common-benefit lawyers perform most 
of the legal work for plaintiffs on discovery, motions, and other pretri-
al matters.  When Professor Campos writes of a defendant’s ability to 
“divide and conquer the plaintiffs,” he is describing a theoretical 
problem that does not jibe with the reality of multidistrict litigation 
and other mass consolidated proceedings.  In this regard, it is worth 
noting that Professor Campos mentions only two actual mass torts:  
Agent Orange and asbestos.  These are important mass torts, to be 
sure, but they largely reflect the mass tort litigation of the 1980s and the 
concerns of a prior generation of proceduralists.  The question for a 
new generation should be how to reach just and efficient resolutions in 
light of the realities of post-Amchem, post-fen-phen mass tort litigation. 
In theory, the idea of mandatory class actions offers a way to en-
sure perfect collectivization and therefore equalization of litigation 
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incentives.  In reality, however, what is the marginal gain?  Since mass 
tort litigation, as currently handled, already involves very significant 
common benefit work by experienced and well-resourced lawyers who 
are incentivized to invest in the litigation based on aggregate stakes, it 
is unclear what is actually gained by compelling perfect collectiviza-
tion through mandatory class actions.  Moreover, since mass tort liti-
gation often is resolved through mass aggregate settlements nego-
tiated in the context of MDL and other nonclass litigation, it is 
unclear how much is gained by compelling a comprehensive resolution. 
Professor Campos mentions the possibility of solutions other than 
mandatory class actions, including multidistrict litigation.  His vision 
of multidistrict litigation, however, bears a troubling resemblance to 
mandatory class actions.  According to Professor Campos, mass torts 
demand “compelled, collective ownership of the claims,” which can be 
accomplished by mandatory class actions or by “procedures like mul-
tidistrict litigation, where a court assigns collective ownership of the 
claims to lead counsel for common benefit work, at least for pretrial 
purposes.”  I understand how collective ownership can be a plausible 
description of the dynamics of class actions (although we should be 
clear even in the class action setting that the claims belong to the 
claimants even after class certification).  But collective ownership does 
not and should not describe the role of leadership counsel in MDL 
and other consolidated nonclass litigation. 
Perhaps what Professor Campos characterizes as “collective owner-
ship of the claims” can be better understood in terms of separation of 
ownership and control.  See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE 
LITIGATION § 1.05 Reporters’ Notes, cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 2010) 
(drawing a connection between the insights of economic literature on 
the separation of ownership and control in the corporate context and 
the problems of aggregate litigation).  In a mandatory class action, the 
owners of the claims (class members) are compelled to relinquish 
control of their claims to class counsel and class representatives.  In a 
nonmandatory class action, the owners similarly relinquish control un-
less they opt out.  The separation of ownership and control presents 
agency risks but also provides significant advantages to the claims 
owners.  These advantages, such as the incentive for counsel to invest 
in the litigation based on aggregate stakes and the ability to pursue 
claims that would not be viable individually, justify class certification 
in cases with sufficiently cohesive claims.  Nonclass mass litigation in-
volves a separation of ownership and control, but to a different degree 
than class actions.  In multidistrict litigation, the owners of the claims 
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(plaintiffs in cases that are centralized) are compelled to relinquish 
much of the control over pretrial litigation to counsel appointed to do 
common benefit work.  As a practical matter, control over settlement 
negotiations often shifts to leadership counsel in MDL as well.  But 
unlike in class actions, plaintiffs in nonclass litigation retain the right 
to decide whether to accept a particular settlement.  There is a big dif-
ference between aggregate processing and aggregate resolution.  
MDL involves collective control of pretrial litigation work and collec-
tive efforts at generating negotiated resolutions, but it does not and 
should not involve compelled collective resolution of claims. 
“Compelled, collective ownership,” to use Professor Campos’s 
phrase, upends the notion that a tort claim belongs to the tort clai-
mant.  I have tried to show that such a radical approach offers less 
than it appears to offer, in light of the collective nature of mass tort 
practice.  Professor Campos considers such a radical approach neces-
sary in part because of his assessment that the future of mass torts, like 
its present, is “bleak.”  But I must ask, bleak compared to what?  Com-
pared to individual tort claimants, it is not at all clear that mass tort 
claimants are worse off.  In a world of mass collective representation, 
mass aggregate proceedings, and mass settlement negotiations, clai-
mants in mass litigation benefit from leverage and economies of scale 
that are unavailable to individual plaintiffs.  It is unsurprising that 
mass torts often result in substantial compensation for individual 
claimants, and it is worth asking whether the same results would have 
been obtained had the claimants been unlucky enough to be injured 
alone. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
Setting the Right Priorities in Mass Torts 
Sergio J. Campos 
I am grateful to have Professor Howard Erichson as an interlocu-
tor.  He is not only an expert in mass tort litigation who is well res-
pected by both scholars and practitioners, but also someone who takes 
great care in addressing those with opposing views.  I want to return 
the favor by affording the same respect to Professor Erichson’s views, 
and, in doing so, clarify where we disagree. 
Professor Erichson is right to say that our disagreement is not 
about whether aggregate procedures should be used in mass tort liti-
gation, but about what form it should take.  Our disagreement, how-
ever, reveals a difference in priorities.  In a nutshell, we disagree on 
whether we should “upend[] the notion that a tort claims belongs to 
the tort claimant.”  Professor Erichson believes that this notion of 
claim ownership should be, and for the most part is, accommodated 
by existing aggregate procedures for mass tort litigation.  However, in 
my view, claim ownership should not be accommodated at all.  As I 
argued in my Opening Statement, protecting claim ownership un-
dermines the prevention of mass torts.  Thus, we should be willing to 
upend the notion of claim ownership, particularly when it leads to the 
very mass torts the claim is meant to remedy. 
Professor Erichson recognizes the problem of asymmetric stakes 
in mass tort litigation and the unfair advantage it gives the mass tort 
defendant.  He also acknowledges the loss of deterrence this unfair 
advantage causes.  Professor Erichson, however, questions the “mar-
ginal gain” of procedures like mandatory class actions that result in 
what I called “compelled, collective ownership of the claims.”  As Pro-
fessor Erichson correctly concludes, “compelled, collective ownership 
of the claims” means compelled assignment of dispositive control over 
the claims to a third party—such as class counsel—with the plaintiffs 
remaining as beneficiaries. 
However, as Professor Erichson points out, in practice the playing 
field levels out significantly.  Unlike the mass torts of the past, mass 
tort litigation today is resolved through multidistrict litigation and 
other mass aggregation procedures that involve a fair amount of sepa-
ration between ownership and control.  For Professor Erichson, it is 
unclear whether the “perfect collectivization” I prescribe “strikes a 
better balance between the need for a level playing field and the rec-
2011] The Future of Mass Torts 243 
ognition that tort claims belong to tort claimants.” 
I question whether we should strike any such balance.  Admittedly, 
the aggregation procedures that Professor Erichson describes signifi-
cantly narrow the gap between the defendant and the plaintiffs.  
However, while the plaintiffs may imperfectly collectivize their claims 
to realize greater leverage and economies of scale, the defendant is 
already perfectly collectivized.  The defendant owns all of the poten-
tial liability associated with an issue common to the plaintiffs.  The de-
fendant, in fact, is perfectly collectivized regardless of whether the 
plaintiffs proceed through a class action, through multidistrict litiga-
tion, or through individual actions.  It is unclear why the defendant is 
allowed to enjoy “perfect collectivization” while the plaintiffs must set-
tle for less.  Indeed, in reaching imperfect collectivization, plaintiffs 
incur costs that the defendant avoids, such as search costs in building 
client inventories. 
Nevertheless, imperfect collectivization may be sufficient.  As Pro-
fessor Erichson notes, plaintiffs’ attorneys who are assigned as lead 
counsel, to steering committees, or to engage in common benefit 
work, are all well compensated, since they typically receive some por-
tion of any judgments or settlements in the litigation.  Thus, substan-
tial aggregation leads to substantial incentives to invest in common 
benefit work.  But again, the defendant’s attorneys are not just sub-
stantially incentivized to invest in common issues (the flip side of 
common benefit work).  The defendant’s attorneys are perfectly in-
centivized, because, again, the defendant owns all of the liability asso-
ciated with any issue common to the class.  While the plaintiffs’ imper-
fect aggregation substantially increases the incentive to invest in 
common benefit work, it still cannot match the perfect incentives that 
the defendant has to invest in common issues. 
I would further admit the possibility that perfect incentives to in-
vest in common issues may not be necessary.  The investments may 
have diminishing or discontinuous returns.  See Lee Anne Fennell, 
Slices and Lumps 2-3 (Univ. of Chicago Law & Econ., Olin Working Pa-
per, Paper No. 395, 2008) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1106421.  Consequently, some amount 
of aggregation, short of perfection, may be all that is needed.  After 
all, the plaintiffs may find the “smoking gun” with “some minimal lev-
el of investment,” and most mass tort litigation arises from such trig-
gering events.  See RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF 
SETTLEMENT 117-18 (2007).  However, it is hard to know the amount 
of aggregation any given case requires.  Like all research and devel-
opment efforts, in mass tort litigation no one knows how much in-
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vestment is needed to find a “smoking gun” until it is found.  Never-
theless, a sufficient level of investment is highly unlikely given the 
many investments that can maximize the plaintiff’s recovery, such as 
legal research or hiring attorneys and experts.  Again, unlike the 
plaintiffs, the defendant does not have to settle for less than perfec-
tion and hope that it is enough.  Indeed, the defendant can take ad-
vantage of greater financing options to fund these investments than 
the plaintiffs, who, due to restrictions like the law of champerty and 
maintenance, are limited to debt financing.  See Benyamin Appel-
baum, Putting Money on Lawsuits, Investors Share in the Payouts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/11/15/business/15lawsuit.html. 
In sum, I agree with Professor Erichson that, in the real world of 
mass tort litigation, the playing field is substantially leveled.  Neverthe-
less, in the real world, the defendant still has the upper hand.  We sa-
crifice perfection on the plaintiffs’ side, even though the defendant 
inherently begins with perfection. 
It is reasonable to ask, as Professor Erichson does, what is the 
“marginal gain” from seeking “perfect collectivization” for the plain-
tiffs, when perfection risks taking the tort claim away from the clai-
mant.  But the better question concerns the marginal cost of imperfect 
procedures.  Less than perfection, particularly when the defendant al-
ready has perfection, does more than lead to a bias in favor of the de-
fendant in the litigation.  It weakens the incentives for the defendant 
to avoid mass torts in the first place. 
A recent example can be found in the litigation surrounding the 
Deepwater Horizon rig explosion and subsequent oil spill.  Due to lax 
regulatory oversight, BP cut corners on safety measures that could 
have prevented a blowout on the rig.  In fact, a Congressional investi-
gation found that the rig’s blowout preventer had a hydraulic leak and 
a dead battery, which may have lead to the explosion.  Deepwater Hori-
zon Blowout Preventer “Faulty”—Congress, BBC NEWS, http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8679090.stm (last updated May 13, 
2010).  Of course, one cannot undo the past, and further investiga-
tions may reveal different causes for the explosion.  But it is worth ask-
ing whether BP would have used a defective blowout preventer had it 
known it would face perfectly collectivized plaintiffs in future litigation. 
The weakened incentives that arise from imperfect collectivization 
may only result in a marginal decrease in deterrence.  In this situa-
tion, people get less deterrence, but at least can keep their claim.  But 
I doubt anyone would willingly make that trade.  The marginal de-
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crease in deterrence means an increased risk of harm, which can re-
sult in injuries like death, cancer, and disabilities that cannot be re-
medied by damages.  Moreover, expected recovery would likely be less 
in procedures such as multidistrict litigation, since there would be 
lower investment in common benefit work (and thus a lower probabil-
ity of recovery) relative to a mandatory class action.  Finally, recovery 
is costlier in procedures like multidistrict litigation given the costs of 
coordinating with other plaintiffs and attorneys, costs that are avoided 
by a mandatory class action.  Indeed, mandatory class actions can fur-
ther drive down costs by using procedures like damage scheduling.  
Thus, in addition to less deterrence, lower and costlier expected re-
covery results.  I am at a loss as to why anyone would prefer this in the 
name of keeping her claim.  It is akin to preferring a fire extinguisher 
that not only functions imperfectly, but actually causes more fires. 
Admittedly, with perfect collectivization from a mandatory class 
action comes the possibility of inadequate representation.  But pro-
tecting against inadequate representation has nothing to do with pro-
tecting claim ownership, as I argued in my Opening Statement.  More 
importantly, why should claim ownership stop us from doing the best 
we can?  We should not let the good enough be the enemy of perfect 
collectivization. 
Professor Erichson’s concern with preserving “the notion that the 
tort claim belongs to the tort claimant” parallels the Supreme Court’s 
preoccupation with a day in court.  I agree with Professor Erichson 
that a day in court is rarely a possibility in mass tort litigation.  But the 
Court does not mean “day in court” when it says “day in court.”  In-
stead, and as I argued in the Opening Statement, it means an almost 
absolute right to own one’s tort claim.  Indeed, the Court, like Profes-
sor Erichson, wants to avoid “upend[ing] the notion that a tort claim 
belongs to the tort claimant,” as reflected in recent cases concerning 
class actions, preclusion law, and the Rules Enabling Act.  See, e.g., 
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1443 
(2010) (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) (concluding that a class action 
under Rule 23 would not violate the Rules Enabling Act at least to the 
extent that it includes “willing plaintiffs”). 
However, the cost of not upending that right is an invasion of a 
higher-order interest—the right to avoid the tort altogether.  One 
could understand this interest in deterrence as a “liberty” interest—
”[the] right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjusti-
fied intrusions on personal security”—as the Court has suggested in 
prior cases.  Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) (quoting 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).  Perhaps by explicitly re-
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cognizing an interest in deterrence as a “liberty” interest, we can more 
clearly see the cost of protecting the tort claim as a “property” interest. 
I want to conclude by identifying an important source of agree-
ment.  Professor Erichson’s concern with protecting a tort claimant’s 
control over the claim is motivated, in part, by a recent proposal from 
the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation 
concerning aggregate settlements.  Section 3.17(b) of the Principles 
permits clients to agree in advance to accept an aggregate settlement 
if a majority of the plaintiffs vote in favor of it.  By design, section 
3.17(b) undermines the consent normally required for a valid settle-
ment because it forces a client to accept an offer, whether she likes it 
or not, if certain conditions are met.  It does so in the name of achiev-
ing closure or global peace. 
In a recent article, Professor Erichson has criticized “closure” as a 
legitimate rationale for section 3.17(b) because it undermines the 
“consent” necessary to legitimate the settlement.  See Howard M. 
Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL 
L. REV. 265 (2011).  I, too, reject closure as a legitimate goal, but not 
to protect consent; rather, to protect deterrence.  As should be clear, I 
am more than willing to undermine claim ownership and consent, but 
only because I want to prevent mass torts from occurring in the first 
place.  In fact, one danger of a focus on closure is that the defendant 
may be able to escape the full liability associated with its actions, such 
as with the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, which al-
lowed airlines to escape a significant amount of liability.  We may disag-
ree on whether ownership of the tort claim should be protected, but on 
the issue of global peace, Professor Erichson is on the side of angels. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
Substance, Procedure, and Change in Mass Torts 
Howard M. Erichson 
When thinking about the future of mass torts, we might begin by 
asking what is unlikely to disappear.  With a sense of the unchanging, 
we can better focus on real change and its opportunities and risks.  I 
propose that the following things are unlikely to disappear in the fore-
seeable future:  (1) mass production, mass marketing, mass transpor-
tation, and other conditions that similarly situate large numbers of 
people; (2) mass harms that occasionally result from wrongful con-
duct; (3) legal obligations that flow from a sense that justice some-
times requires transferring wealth from perpetrators of such wrongful 
conduct to their victims; (4) a market for lawyers representing victims 
of such mass harms; and (5) a shared interest by plaintiffs and defen-
dants in resolving claims by settlement rather than adjudication.  In 
other words, regardless of particular procedures for administering 
and adjudicating such claims, litigation and settlement of mass torts is 
not a passing phenomenon. 
These points of predictability leave plenty up for grabs.  Judicial 
procedures for coordinating mass litigation have evolved significantly 
in the past several decades and show no sign of stagnating.  Just as 
judicial procedures change, so does the nature of law practice.  Re-
cent years have seen dramatic changes in the way plaintiffs’ lawyers 
gather clients and coordinate efforts; economic and technological de-
velopments will continue to fuel these changes in mass litigation prac-
tice.  Settlement structures evolve as well.  Indeed, mass tort settle-
ment structures appear to be in a particularly experimental stage as 
lawyers seek ways to accomplish closure within the bounds of legal and 
ethical constraints. 
Professor Campos argues in favor of mandatory class actions for 
mass torts, but what Professor Campos wants is not really procedural 
reform, but rather a fundamental change in how our legal system 
conceives of tort claims in the context of mass harms.  In his Closing 
Statement, Professor Campos takes issue with my assertion that tort 
claims belong to tort claimants.  He correctly reads me to believe that 
individual claim ownership can be accommodated by aggregate pro-
cedures in which mass tort litigation is practiced and processed on a 
collective basis but in which claimants ultimately retain the right to 
decide whether to release their claims in settlement.  Professor Cam-
pos responds to this view not with any disagreement about the possi-
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bility of such accommodation, but with the argument that “claim 
ownership should not be accommodated at all.”  In his view, we 
should remove control of tort claims from the claimants because “pro-
tecting claim ownership undermines the prevention of mass torts.” 
Prevention of mass harms is a worthy goal, but Professor Campos 
wrongly assumes that embracing this goal warrants reimagining tort 
claims as collective property.  His argument suffers from several de-
fects.  First, in focusing on the regulatory role of tort litigation, he los-
es sight of tort law’s other functions.  Second, he displays an overop-
timistic faith in the power of tort litigation to alter corporate conduct.  
Third, he downplays the agency risks in class actions as well as the dif-
ferences among claimants in personal injury mass torts. 
While few would disagree that deterrence is an important goal of 
tort litigation, Professor Campos assumes either that deterrence is the 
only worthwhile goal or that it should trump all other goals.  Tort liti-
gation functions as an important supplement to direct regulation and 
Professor Campos is correct that mass harms often reflect gaps and 
inadequacies in our regulatory systems.  In the United States, political 
resistance to expansive and expensive government bureaucracies 
means that we rely heavily on litigation to supplement regulatory en-
forcement.  Professor Campos takes this point too far, however, when 
he suggests that tort claimants’ ownership of claims does not matter.  
Tort law does not merely impose penalties on wrongdoers—it grants a 
right of compensation to victims.  If ownership of claims is irrelevant, 
then why should we address the problem of mass harms through tort 
litigation rather than through other forms of regulation? 
Professor Campos exhibits a strong faith not only that litigation 
can influence corporate conduct for the better, but also that manda-
tory class actions would appreciably augment this influence as com-
pared with other forms of aggregate litigation.  Professor Campos says 
that “it is worth asking whether BP would have used a defective blo-
wout preventer had it known it would face perfectly collectivized 
plaintiffs in future litigation.”  Admittedly, the impact of procedural 
reform on any particular piece of corporate behavior is a matter of 
speculation, but given the extent to which corporations already fear 
mass litigation, it strikes me as naïve to suggest that the difference be-
tween current forms of aggregation and mandatory class actions 
would have saved the Gulf. 
If Professor Campos seems overconfident about class actions’ posi-
tive influence, perhaps it is because he downplays the risks of class ac-
tions.  His argument assumes that for any given set of meritorious 
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claims, a class action would result in greater total liability than non-
class mass litigation.  Because of agency risks in class actions, the op-
posite may be true.  By strengthening counsel’s control over settle-
ment, class certification creates a risk that class counsel will agree to 
settle claims for less than their full value.  In settlement class actions, 
counsel may agree to a low settlement price to win the opportunity to 
move forward as putative class counsel; this is the reverse auction 
problem Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. identified in Class Wars:  The Di-
lemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1370 
(1995), and the Supreme Court considered in its rejection of an as-
bestos settlement class action in Amchem Products v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 
591 (1997).  In litigation class actions, counsel may agree to a low set-
tlement price to guarantee a substantial payday rather than face the 
risk and expense of protracted litigation.  Mandatory class actions ex-
acerbate this risk by removing the possibility of exit.  Professor Cam-
pos’s deterrence-based argument in favor of mandatory class actions 
relies entirely on the prospect that such actions would increase defen-
dants’ liability and thereby create a stronger disincentive to harmful 
conduct, but the settlement dynamics of class actions make this a ques-
tionable prospect outside of the context of small-claims class actions. 
Courts generally deny class certification in personal injury mass 
tort cases.  See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450 (E.D. 
La. 2006); In re Baycol Prods. Liab. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 197 (D. Minn. 
2003).  In light of the individualized issues in personal injury litiga-
tion, courts sensibly resist delivering control to class counsel.  Without 
sufficiently cohesive claims, class certification presents not only the 
lawyer-client conflicts the previous paragraph describes, but also a risk 
of intraclass conflicts—that is, the danger that groups or individuals 
within a class may be treated unfairly vis-à-vis the rest of the class.  The 
benefits of class certification require a strong degree of class cohesion.  
Such cohesion may occur in many types of litigation, including certain 
consumer claims of economic harm based on uniform corporate con-
duct.  Personal injury claims based on product liability or other mass 
tortious conduct, however, tend to involve differences among claimants 
that render class certification both less useful and more dangerous. 
Let me be clear that in arguing against mandatory class actions for 
mass torts, I am not advocating an anti-aggregation position.  Aggre-
gate procedures such as multidistrict litigation and statewide consoli-
dation remain essential tools for the efficient processing of claims in 
mass litigation, and mass collective representation by plaintiffs’ coun-
sel gives plaintiffs needed leverage to level the field with defendants.  
Rather, I am arguing against a mindset that when mass harms are at 
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issue, individual claimants do not matter. 
The Supreme Court understands the class action rule to be “pro-
cedural” in the Erie context, see Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 139 S. Ct. 1431 (2010), and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23 has not been held to violate the Rules Enabling Act’s command 
that rules of procedure “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any subs-
tantive right.”  28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).  When Professor Campos 
argues for mandatory class actions because “claim ownership should 
not be accommodated at all,” his reasoning makes the leap from pro-
cedure to substance—not in the sense of altering substantive tort law 
as it applies to each claim, but in the sense that he reconceives the na-
ture of tort claims as collective rather than individual. 
There is nothing inherently wrong with altering substantive law in 
the mass harm setting.  Courts have done so, albeit rarely, to reach 
more accurate liability determinations in cases involving fungible 
products and multiple defendants.  See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laborato-
ries, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).  One can imagine a similar move to im-
pose proportionate liability in cases involving indeterminate plaintiffs.  
Professor Campos, however, does not address such reform of substan-
tive tort law as it might apply to each plaintiff’s claim.  Rather, whatev-
er the applicable rules of tort liability, Professor Campos seeks to col-
lectivize control of the tort claims of individual victims of mass harm. 
In the end, our disagreement is not about whether we favor col-
lective litigation—we both do—but rather about whether at the end of 
the day the individual tort claimant should have the power to decide 
whether to release a claim in settlement.  The market already creates 
powerful incentives for collective representation on the plaintiffs’ 
side, and the judicial system powerfully facilitates collective represen-
tation by the appointment of leadership counsel in aggregated litiga-
tion.  Therefore, even in a world without mandatory mass tort class ac-
tions, plaintiffs receive substantial benefits of collective 
representation.  Collective representation creates leverage that drives 
mass tort settlements.  The back-end right of individual claimants to 
decide whether to accept a settlement incentivizes counsel to ensure 
an adequate overall settlement and a fair allocation.  Professor Cam-
pos considers such market-driven and court-facilitated collectivization 
insufficient; he would have the law impose an absolute form of collecti-
vization.  Such absolute collectivization, I have tried to show, carries real 
dangers but only illusory benefits. 
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